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BILs AND NoTEs-GoOD FAITH-NOTICE OF DEFEcrs.P.AiKA v. PERRY
(1917) 114 N. E. (MAss.) 83o.-M. made a contract with the plaintiffs
to remodel the latter's house. The plaintiffs, who were illiterate, were
induced by the fraud of M. to sign a note and mortgage, believing these
instruments comprised the building contract M. negotiated the note and
mortgage, and it passed into the hands of the defendant, who knew that
the mortgage was not to be given until the work on the building had
been performed, and, further, that the mortgage had been given before
any work had been done by M. He also knew that no work had been
done for over two months after the mortgage was given, and that the
plaintiffs were illiterate. Held, that the defendant's action in taking the
note and mortgage amounted to bad faith, so that he took with notice
within Rev. Laws of Mass. (I9o2) chap. 73.
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument, or defect in
the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect,
or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith. Rev. Law of Mass. (I9O2) chap. 73; Mass.
Nat'l. Bank v. Snow (195o) 187 Mass. i59; Lancaster Bank v. Garber
(186) 178 Pa. St 91; New York Mine v. Citizens" Bank (188o) 44 Mich.
344. The court held that the defendant might take with notice within
this rule without knowing the exact fraud practiced on the plaintiff,
citing the following cases: Hager v. Nat'l Bank (i898) io5 Ga. ii6;
Henry v. Sneed (I899) 99 Mo. 4o7. Mere knowledge that a note was
given in consideration of the executory contract of the payee which has
not been performed will not deprive the indorsee of the character of a
bona fide holder. McKnight v. Parsons (907) 136 Ia. 390; Rublee v.
Davis (892) 33 Neb. 783; Houston v. Keith (i911) ioo Miss. 83.
Although the notes were procured by fraud, and given before the con-
tract was performed, the defendant would have been a bona fide holder
in the principal case if he had not been guilty of bad faith. New Eng-
land Trust Co. v. New York Belting Co. (i896) i66 Mass. 42; Burnes v.
Fertilizer Co. (1914) 218 Mass. 300. This fact is brought out by the
actual decision of the case. The facts would clearly seem to justify the
court in holding that the defendant was guilty of bad faith.
.L S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-IMPAIpNa OBLIGATION OF CONTRAcT-STATE
COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT NOT FOLLOWED.-DETRoiT UNITED
RAILWAY v. MICHIGAN (1916) 37 SUP. CT. REP. 87.-By an ordinance of
Jan. 3, 1889, the city of Detroit required the A Ry. Co. to stipulate that
it would sell eight tickets for twenty-five cents, to be good over the entire
route within the city limits. The township of Greenfield, in 1897, granted
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to the B Ry. Co. a franchise to run a railway, but made no such pro-
vision for the sale of tickets. In igoo the defendant company was incor-
porated with power to purchase and acquire other railways, and to use
and enjoy the rights of such companies upon the same terms as they
themselves had. The defendant company purchased the franchises and
property of the A and B companies. Thereafter, in 1907, the legislature
of Michigan annexed part of the township of Greenfield to Detroit, and
provided that all the state and city ordinances applicable to Detroit should
apply to the annexed territory. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in
issuing a mandamus to compel the defendant to observe the provisions of
the ordinance of 1889, construed the contract of the defendant company
witfi the city to mean that the company was to sell eight tickets for
twenty-five cents within the city limits as the limits should be extended.
Held, that the state court's construction of the contract would not be
accepted by the Supreme Court, and that the act of i9o7 impaired the
obligation of the contract Brandeis and Clark, JJ., dissenting.
The Supreme Court as a general rule will accept the construction placed
by the highest court of the state upon the state constitution and statutes,
and upon contracts alleged to be affected by them; but this rule will not
be applied when the question before the court is whether there has been
an impairment of the obligation of a contract. Delmas v. Insurance Com-
pany (1871) 14 Wall. (U. S.) 661; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly (1861) I
Black (U. S.) 436. It will not interfere with a judicial decision on a
construction of the terms of a contract, unless there is a statute involved.
Bacon v. Texas (1895) 163 U. S. 2o7. The impairment clause of the
constitution is concerned only with legislative acts. New Orleans Gas
Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. (i885) rii U. S. 650. Where a state court
enforces a subsequent statute, its construction of the contract will not
be accepted by the Supreme Court even though the act is not specifically
mentioned in the decision of the state court. Carondelet Canal and
Navigation Company v. State of Louisiana (1913) 233 U. S. 362. To
accept the construction of the state court in the principal case is to allow
any state court, by putting a strained construction upon a contract, to
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction. The court in refusing to
accept the construction of the state court seems to be altogether correct,
and the decision is in accord with the settled policy of the Supreme Court
to decide for itself what the terms of the contract are when the question
of the impairment of the obligation of a contract is involved.
F. L. McC.
CRIMINAL LAw-ACCUSED AS WITNESS-COMMENT ON OMISSIONS IN
TESTImoNY-CAMINETTI v. UNITED STATES (1917) 37 SUP. CT. RPv. I92.-
In the Diggs case, the defendant voluntarily took the stand in his own
behalf, but failed to explain incriminating circumstances and events
already in evidence in which he had participated, and concerning which
he was fully informed. Held, that such failure justified comment by the
court, and could be considered by the jury with all the other circum-
stances in reaching a verdict.
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The defendant in a criminal case is under no obligation to become a
witness, and his failure to take the stand does not create any presump-
tion against him. Act of March 16, 1878; 20 St. at L. 30, chap. 37; Comp.
St. 1913, sec. 1465. Whether the defendant's failure to testify as to
material matters, having taken the stand, is ground for comment by the
court, and the subject of inference by the jury, is a disputed point,
hitherto undecided by the Supreme Court. The cases in that court in
which the question has been argued have involved the subsidiary question
of the right of cross-examination under the federal rule, and have been
disposed of either upon the ground that the limit to the right of cross-
examination was not exceeded, Fitzpatrick v. United States (igoo) 178
U. S. 3o4; or, if exceeded, the answers given were not prejudicial to
the respondent, Sawyer v. United States (i9o6) 2o2 U. S. iSo. The
Circuit Court of Appeals, in the eighth and first circuit, has held contrary
to the principal case, on the ground that too great latitude is thus given
to the jury, and too great a burden is put upon the defendant. Balliet
v. United States (1904) 129 Fed. 689; Myrick v. United States (915)
219 Fed. i. The principal case proceeds upon the theory that a defendant
cannot partially waive his constitutional privilege, and if he steps outside
of the circle which the Constitution draws around him, he then subjects
himself to the same rule as that applying to any other witness, and his
silence may be the subject of comment and inferences drawn from it.
This reasoning is generally followed in state jurisdictions. State v. Ober
(1873) 52 N. H. 459; Stover v. People (874) 56 N. Y. 315; Cotton v.
State (1888) 87 Ala. IO3. See Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused
to Testify (1917) 26 YAsE LAw JouRxAL, p. 464.
E. J. M.
EviDENcE-ExPERT OpINiN-FouxnDATIo.-MALNE-McCoNNEL REAL
ESTATE Co. v. StmPsoN Aunrr Co. (i916) 73 So. (ALA.) 369.-An
accountant, conceded to be an expert, made a personal examination of the
books of the defendant and of the audit of the same by the plaintiff, and
stated that plaintiff's work was worthless, giving only some of the facts
upon which his conclusion was based. Held, that the opinion of the
accountant was rightly admitted.
The authorities are not uniform as to whether the opinion of an expert
who has had the opportunity of examination is admissible, if he doesnot first give in detail the facts from which he has drawn his conclusion.
Probably the weight of authority is that such testimony is inadmissible.
Raub v. Carpenter (19o2) 187 U. S. 159; Sauntman v. Maxwell (igoo)
154 Ind. 114; Scott v. Hay (19o3) 90 Minn. 304; State v. Simonis (i901)
39 Or. in; Kinney v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen (I9O5) 15 N. D.
21; Flanagan v. State (i898) io6 Ga. Iog. These courts say that the
expert must first state the facts, so that the jury may judge whether the
facts as well as the opinion are correct, and other experts may express
an opinion on these facts. They say that it is the conclusion from the
facts in evidence, not the general opinion of the expert, which is of
interest to the jury. Where the facts are voluminous, complicated and
difficult, some courts have admitted an opinion without a detailed state-
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ment. Charlotte v. Atlantic Bitulithic Co. (1915) 228 Fed. 456; Schaefer
& Co. v. Ely (1911) 84 Conn. 5oi. Professor Wigmore maintains that
the rule requiring the facts to be stated first is based on a misconception
of the meaning of "opinion." Originally the term was applied only to
guesswork and not intended to hinder or exclude a statement formed
from personal examination. It is sufficient to ask the expert if he has
made an actual examination, and then permit him to state his opinion.
This rule would remove burdensome details, and would work no injustice
to the opposing party, as every fact even to the smallest detail could be
brought out on cross-examination. Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 675, 1922.
This view has been adopted in several comparatively recent cases. People
v. Faber (igio) i99 N. Y. 256; State v. Ross (1915) 178 S. W. (Mo.)
475; Commonwealth v. Johnson (i9o5) i88 Mass. 382. In the principal
case some of the facts were already before the jury, but the language
of the court is in entire accord with the latter doctrine. It is submitted
that any change in the present cumbersome state of our law is exceedingly
desirable.
J. E. H.
EVmENcE-Nox.-ExPmaT OpivNoN-AnmissinmLrry-STATE v. PRuETT
(1916) i6o PAc. (N. M.) 362 The defendant was indicted for murder.
At the trial the state's witnesses testified over objection that they saw
knee-prints adjacent to a cedar bush near the scene of the homicide
One witness stated farther, that the knee-print he identified was at a
normal distance from a toe-print of the left foot and opposite a ball-print
of the right foot Held, that the testimony was admissible.
Opinions of non-expert witnesses are admitted where, by the nature
of the matter, an attempted description, because insufficient or vague,
would leave the jury unable to form a judgment of its own. Com. v.
Sturtivant (1875) 117 Mass. 122; Evans v. People (1858) 12 Mich. 35;
Bates v. Sharon (1873) 45 Vt 481. Under this recognized rule witnesses
have been permitted to express opinions on the physical cause of a great
variety of marks and imprints. The testimony may be as to what kind
of object produced the mark in question, as for example, that overshoes
left certain tracks found in the snow. State v. Ward (i888) 61 Vt 153.
Or it may go farther and indicate what particular one of a class made
the impressions observed. Accordingly, the opinion that certain foot-
prints were left by a particular pair of shoes worn by the defendant
has been admitted. State v. Reitz (188o) 83 N. C. 636. Similarly, the
statement that the wagon-track and hoof-prints about the scene of a theft
were the same as those seen by the witness elsewhere was admitted.
Williams v. State (I916) 182 S. W. (Tex.) 335. A stricter application
is found, however, in some states which permit only a description of
the several tracks, barring opinion thereon. Terry v. State (I898) 23 So.
(Ala.) 776; State v. Green (1893) 40 S. C. 328, 330. The broader rule,
admitting opinion, has been applied to testimony involving other varieties
of marks, seemingly less characteristic. In a homicide case, the witness,
having seen a depression in a bed, stated that in his opinion it was made
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by a person's head. State v. Welch (1892) 36 W. Va. 69o. Testimony,
"that the ends of a person's fingers were like a burn, shiny," also has
been held unobjectionable. Fortier v. Western F'd'y Co. (I915) 182 Ill.
App. 115. The decision also in a very recent case held admissible an
opinion that cuts on plaintiff's thumb were teeth marks which were caused
by a bite. Patterson v. Blatti (I916) 157 N. W. (Minn.) 717. The prin-
cipal case presents an interesting variation of the applicability of the rule,
but in no sense does it seem a departure in principle.
M. S. B.
EViDENCE-NoN-ExPERT'S OPINION AS TO MENTAL CAPACITY-THE
MASSACHusETTs DmsION LINE.-RAYMOND v. FLINT (1917) 114 N. E.
(MASS.) 8II.-In. a proceeding involving the mental condition of a
deceased grantor, a witness was asked whether she noticed anything in
the deceased's conversation, or otherwise, that indicated mental failing.
This question was objected to on the ground that it called for an expres-
sion of an opinion by a non-expert witness. Held, that the question was
competent, as it called for a statement of "fact."
The general rule undoubtedly is that the opinion of a non-expert wit-
ness as to a disputed fact, whether it be operative or evidential in char-
acter, is inadmissible if it involves a fairly elaborate process of inference.
Masterson v. St. Louis Transit Co. (907) 204 Mo. 507; Shuler v. State
(igo6) 126 Ga. 630; Lewis v. Brown (1856) 41 Me. 448. As regards
some questions, particularly those involving sanity or insanity, many juris-
dictions allow the opinions or inferences of lay witnesses provided they
have first placed before the jury the facts upon which the opinion is
based. State v. Smith (igoi) xo6 La. 33; The Berry Will Case (igoi)
93 Md. 56o; State v. Cross (i9oo) 72 Conn. 722. A few courts indeed
go farther and permit a non-expert witness to give his opinion after
merely testifying to having had adequate opportunity for observing the
person whose mental capacity is in issue. Turner v. American Security
& T. Co. (199) 213 U. S. 257; Hardy v. Merrill (1875) 50 N. H. 227;
see Grand Lodge v. Wieting (1897) 168 Ill. 4o8; Grimshaw v. Kent (19o3)
67 Kan. 463. The modem Massachusetts doctrine, however, is less liberal,
for it permits a layman to testify to a person's general rationality only
with reference to particular acts or specific conduct, and not independently
of such particular acts or specific conduct. Hogan v. Roche's Heirs
(190) 179 Mass. 51o; Clark v. Clark (i897) 168 Mass. 523; May v. Bradlee
(1875) 127 Mass. 418; Nash v. Hunt (1874) ii6 Mass. 251; see Wigmore,
Evidence, Vol. III, sec. 1938. In the application of this anomalous rule,
which is presumably adopted to assist the jury in arriving at more accurate
and trustworthy deductions, the Massachusetts courts are often forced
to many fine distinctions which amount to the apotheosis of artificiality.
The following questions were held proper: "any fact which led you to
infer that there was any derangement of intellect," May v. Bradlee,
supra; "that he was not a bright boy," Laplante v. Warren Cotton Mills
(1896) x65 Mass. 487; "whether your sister has failed or has not failed
in her mental capacity during the past five years," Clark v. Clark, supra;
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"whether the testatrix knew what she was talking about at that time,"
Hogan v. Roche's Heirs, supra. On the other hand, the court excluded:
"whether from the general appearance of the testator he considered him
capable of making a contract or of transacting important business," Smith
v. Smith (1892) I57 Mass. 389; "was he subject to delusions or hallu-
cinations," Ratigan v. Judge (i9o2) 181 Mass. 572. The court in the
principal case has apparently followed the established precedent in that
jurisdiction of arriving at a more or less arbitrary conclusion under the
guise of distinguishing between "opinion" and "fact." Obviously such
a differentiation can, at best, be only one of degree. Whether the doctrine
be right or wrong, it should be placed upon its true basis.
S. F. D.
ExcHANGE oF PRoPERTY-REscISSIoN-VAL
UE OF THE LAND AS RLIEF.-
ROHR V. SHAFFER ET AL. (I916) 16o N. W. (IA.) 279.-The defendant
represented that certain land situated in Canada was of good quality,
capable of immediate cultivation and free from stones, swamp, and brush.
Relying on this representation, the plaintiff exchanged his interest in Iowa
land for the Canadian land. In reality, this land was partially covered
with water and was wholly unfit for cultivation. The plaintiff tendered a
reqonveyance of the Canadian land and asked that the defendant be
required to reinvest him with the title to the Iowa land or to give dam-
ages in lieu thereof. Held, that upon rescission, the land having been
sold, the plaintiff could recover the value of the interest which he formerly
had in it.
The general principles with respect to fraud and the power of the
contracting party to rescind are equally applicable to the exchanges of
land for land as to any other form of transaction. Thus a party to
an exchange may, on account of a fraud as to the quality and practical
use of the land, ask a court of equity to rescind the transaction and
force the other to his duty of reconveyance Burgen v. Boardman (1914)
254 Mo. 238; Benham v. Tipton (1915) 181 S. W. (Tex.) 510; Spence
v. Hull (1915) 146 Pac. (Or.) 95. As rescission means the undoing of
the former transaction, in general there must be a restoration to the
former status. But rescission for fraud will not be denied to the injured
party because restitution cannot be made by the wrongdoer, he having
parted in the meantime with the property, the subject matter of the
contract Wolfinger v. Thomas (igo8) 22 N. D. 57; Parks v. Brooks
(1915) 155 N. W. (Mich.) 450; Daiker v. Strelinger (1898) 
5o
N. Y. S. io7. In such a situation, equity will grant relief to the
defrauded party by giving him, in lieu of the land which should
otherwise have been returned, the value of the same. Valentine v.
Richardt (i8gi) 13 N. Y. S. 417; Fulton v. Fisher (1911) 151 Ia. 429;
Wright v. Chandler (915) 173 S. W. (Tex.) 1173; Forrest v. Wardman
(913) 40 App. D. C. 52o. The court regards the defendant as a con-
structive trustee for the plaintiff. Considered in this light, the plaintiff
is entitled to the value of the land, to the funds realized from its sale,
or to any property purchased through the proceeds derived from the sale
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of the original land by this trustee. Dorsey v. Wolcott (1898) z73 Ill.
539; Taylor v. Kelly (857) 3 Jones (N. C. Eq.) 24o; cf. Huxley v.
Rice (1879) 40 Mich. 73; Kinney v. Keplinger (1899) 89 Ill. App. 570.
A. S. B.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS iN
THE APPAM: CAsE-THE ApP.& (MARCH 6, 1917) U. S. Sup. CT., OcT.
TEM, 1916, Nos. 65o AND 722.-The Appam, an English vessel, captured
by a German raider, came into the port of Hampton Roads, an unconvoyed
prize, for purposes of permanent internment rather than seeling to secure
a temporary asylum. Held, that restitution of the vessel would be made
to the English owners.
For a discussion of the principles involved in this case in accord with
the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court, see comment (i16) 26 YALE
LAW JoURNAL, 148.
G. S., JR.
MARRIAGE-FRAUD--ANNULMENT ON GROUND OF REFUSAL TO COHArIT.-.-
SAMUELS V. SAMUELS (91) 56 N. Y. L. J. 2o52.-The husband brought
an action for the annulment of a marriage on the ground of fraud by
the wife in entering into the marriage contract. The plaintiff alleged
and proved that the respondent had a preconceived intention not to permit
marital intercourse; that she had carried out her intention, and that the
marriage, in consequence, had not been consummated. Held, that the
marriage would be annulled for fraud.
The decision in the principal case is the first of its kind in the state
of New York, although there are dicta to the same effect in several cases
in that state. For a discussion of earlier American cases in which the same
conclusion was reached on a similar statement of facts, see Anders v.
Anders (igi6) 113 N. E. (Mass.) 2o3 in (igi6) 26 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 159.
B. L.
MASTER An SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTr-ExcLusvw
CHARACTER.-SHrANAHAN V. MONARCH ENGINEERING Co. (igi6) 114 N. E.
(N. Y.) 795.-The constitution of New York, Art I, sec. I8, declares that
the right to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never
be abrogated. Sec. ig, added in 1913, says that nothing in the constitu-
tion shall limit the power of the legislature to enact laws for the pro-
tection of employees and for compensation for injuries and death, and
that the legislature may make these rights and remedies exclusive. The
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. Igo, provides an action for wrongful
death for the benefit, among others, of brothers and sisters. The Work-
men's Compensation Act (Consol. Laws, chap. 67) provides that every
subscribing employer shall pay compensation according to the schedules
stated, and that as to such employers this liability shall be exclusive.
Provision is then made for dependent parents, wives, husbands, and
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children under eighteen. Held, that the Workmen's Compensation Law
was exclusive, and adult brothers and sisters could not recover under
the Code of Civil Procedure. Bartlett, C. J., and Chase, J., dissenting.
The legislature may make the recovery under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law exclusive and deny a recovery on all other actions. Alien
dependents were unable to recover under an act limiting compensation
to residents of the United States, although they would have had a good
cause of action at common law. Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works (1914)
86 N. J. L. 61o. An act, reciting the weaknesses of the common law in
actions by employees against employers and withdrawing all phases of
the premises from private controversy and making the employer liable
without negligence, removed the rights of the employee against third
parties. Peet v. Mills (1913) 76 Wash. 437. But this doctrine has been
repudiated by the federal courts. Meese v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1914)
211 Fed. 254, reversing 2o6 Fed. 222. The cases may possibly be recon-
ciled on the ground that the action was against an officer of the employing
corporation, and consequently not against a third party. A statute declar-
ing that if the employee accepts compensation under this act, such action
shall constitute a release to the employer of all claims or demands at law,
does not prevent the mother from suing the employer at common law
for the loss of the son's services. King v. Viscoloid Co. (1914) 219 Mass.
42o. In New York the courts have already begun to restrict the force
of the word "exclusive." They have held that this clause applies only
to employers and does not prevent an action against third parties.
Lester v. Otis Elevator Co. (1915) 153 N. Y. S. 1058. They have also held
that the term "exclusive" does not apply to schedules not covered by the
act and that the right to recover for an injury to an ear, an injury not
covered by the schedules, remained as it was at common law. Shenneck v.
Clover Farms Co. (i915) 154 N. Y. S. 423. The lower courts of New York,
whose reasoning the dissenting judges adopt in the principal case, would
extend this doctrine one step farther. They maintain that the legislature
intended the remedies in the Workaen's Compensation Act to be
exclusive only as regards those who were there provided for and that
there was no intention to remove any common-law remedy without substi-
tuting another, so that the plaintiff might maintain an action under the
Code of Civil Procedure. The majority adopt a stricter construction,
declaring the language of the act to be clear, and that if any injustice
is caused thereby, the remedy is by an amendment by the legislature and
not by a strained construction of the act.
J.RH.
MAS1MM AiN SExRvA-WoRKMENS COmPENsATiON Acr-INjupY
AmsiNG ouT OF EmpLoym=r-FoLEY v. HomE RMmM Co. (1917) 99 Arm.
(N. J.) 624.-The plaintiff's husband, a traveling salesman, with the
knowledge of defendant his employer, engaged passage on the Lusitania
on a visit to the London office of defendant company. On the voyage the
steamer was destroyed by a submarine. Held, that this was an accident
"arising out of the employment" for which the plaintiff was entitled to
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recover compensation on the ground that the defendant was chargeable
with knowledge that England and Germany were at war.
The words "arising out of the employment" as found in the Workmen's
Compensation Act are descriptive of the character and quality of the
accident and refer to origin or cause. Hills v. Blair (1914) 182 Mich. 20;
Fitzgerald v. Clark & Son [19o8] 2 K. B. 796. The criterion is not that
other persons are exposed to the same dangers but rather that the
employment renders the servant peculiarly subject to the danger. Sym-
monds v. King (1915) 8 B. W. C. C. i89. The principal case follows those
courts which hold that the words "arising out of" make it a condition
precedent to the right to recover compensation that the accident shall have
resulted from a risk which might have been contemplated by a reasonable
person as incidental to the employment Bryant v. Fissell (1913) 84
N. J. L. 72; Collins v. Collins [1907] 2 I. R. lO4; Blake v. Head (1912)
io6 L. T. R. 822; Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury (1i6) 158 Pac. (Cal.)
212. The danger of the destruction of the ship by a submarine was one
to be reasonably apprehended by the defendant When it is considered
that the purpose of the act is to relieve a social condition, it is difficult
to see why so much stress is laid upon the subjective test. Whether the
business caused the injury depends on the sequence of events and, from
that point of view, the test should be an objective one.
R. L. S.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-OBLIGATION TO CoNVEY REAL ESTATE-DECE-
DENT'S ESTATE.-THoMAS V. HEDDON (1916) 114 N. E. (IND.) 218.-One
McNaughton leased premises to Thomas with the option to purchase for
$i7,ooo at the expiration of the lease. McNaughton died testate but
without providing for conveyance. Subsequently the option was exercised
and tender made both to the executor and the heirs. Then this action
was brought for specific performance. The Indiana statute (Bums' Ann.
St, secs. 2897-29oo) provides that where a decedent has contracted for
conveyance, his executor may file a petition to have a commissioner
appointed to convey and thereafter maintain an action for the purchase
money. Held, that under this statute it was the duty of the executor to
petition for conveyance by a commissioner when there is doubt as to who
should receive the payment and that the lessee might secure the appoint-
ment of a commissioner by filing a bill for specific perf6rmance.
The Indiana statute does not expressly cover the case of an option.
It provides for cases of title-bonds or contracts. Furthermore, if the
statute did include options, rights under it would not extend to the lessee,
they being conferred expressly on the executor. Peculiarly enough, the
statutes of most states provide only for exactly the reverse situation, being
thereby a sort of legal complement to the Indiana statute. (19o2) Mass.
Rev. Laws, chap. r48, sec. i; (1911) Wis. Sts., secs. 3907-3912; (1905) Minn.
Rev. Laws, secs. 3777-3780; (igio) Old. Rev. Laws, secs. 641o-6414; (i9II)
Tex. Rev. Civ. Sts., arts. 3518-3520. In the principal case the whole trafisac-
tion may be regarded as a single contract, tender of purchase money being
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a condition precedent. See Arthur L. Corbin, Option Contracts (1914) 23
YAiE LAW JouRNAL, 650. Even assuming this reasoning, the Indiana
court would seem in effect to have legislated on behalf of the lessee, but it
has thereby doubtless accomplished the general purpose of the legislature.
bne question was raised in the case but not decided by the court, namely,
as between the executor and the heirs of the lessor, who should receive the
purchase money? The English and American rule regards land subject to
option as converted into personalty, although there is some difference of
opinion as to when the conversion takes place, whether at the time of the
agreement or when the option is exercised. Under this rule of fictitious
conversion, therefore, the decisions favor the executor. Townley v. Bed-
well (i8o8) 14 Ves. 591; Kerr v. Day (1850) 14 Pa. St 112; Newport W.
Wks. v. Sisson (1893) 18 R. I. 411; Clapp v. Tower (19o3) ii N. D. 556.
Ohio adopts the opposite view, however, to the profit of the heir, and in
the case of an option much can be said for this position. Smith v.
Lowenstein (1893) 50 Oh. St. 346. In a very recent case the court, after
reviewing the authorities and considering numerous arguments, decided
in accordance with the Ohio rule. Ingraham v. Chandler (1917) 16r N. W.
(Ia.) 434.
M. S. B.
STATUTES-WIrE SLAVE TRArIc AcT-CoNsTRucTrIoN.-CAMiNETvI V.
UNITED STATES (1917) 37 SuP. CT. REP. i92.-The White Slave Traffic
Act of June 25, 191o (36 St. at L. 825, chap. 395; Comp. St. 1913, see.
8813) made criminal the transportation, or the causing to be transported,
or the obtaining, aiding, or assisting in the transportation in interstate
commerce of women or girls for the purpose of prostitution, debauchery,
or "for any other immoral purpose." Held, that the transportation of a
woman in interstate commerce in order that she might be debauched, or
become a mistress or concubine, although unaccompanied by the expecta-
tion of pecuniary gain, was a violation of the act. White, C. J., McKenna
and Clark, JJ., dissenting.
The question in the case involved the meaning of the clause, "any other
immoral purpose." In determining the meaning of a statute, the words,
when clear, are decisive. Lake County v. Rollins (1888) 13o U. S. 662.
The words in question, though clear in meaning, are general and uncertain
in their application, and should be limited to those objects to which the
legislature intended to apply them. United States v. Palmer (1818) 3
Wheat. (U. S.) 61o. While it is the duty of the court to yield to the
words of the statute, nevertheless, in determining what meaning it was
intended to have, it is proper to consider its spirit, the object it was
intended to subserve, and the evils it was intended to remedy. United
States v. Wiltberger (182o) 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76; Mosle v. Bidwell
(19o4) 13o Fed. 334. In the construction of a remedial statute, cases
not within the reason, although within the letter of the statute, should
not be taken to be within it. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States (18gi) 143 U. S. 457; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Root (1855)
8 Md. 95. The holding of the majority judges in the principal case
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recognizes as valid the regulation by the federal government-by virtue
of the commerce clause-of matters hitherto dealt with by the states under
their police power. E. J. M.
WILLs-CoNFwLIcT OF LAWS-STATUTE GOVERNING DOWER.-JACKMAN V.
Hm CK (1917) 161 N. W. (IA.) 97.The testator died domiciled in
New Hampshire, having land in Iowa. He devised to his widow a life
estate in all his lands. By the statutes of Iowa the widow was entitled
to a one-third interest in the Iowa land. Held, that the Iowa law gov-
erned and consequently the widow took both her statutory one-third
interest and the life estate devised to her, although she would not have
been entitled to any statutory interest under the laws of New Hampshire.
The defendant in this case contended that the widow's rights in her
husband's estate of both realty and personalty were governed by the law
of the domicile of the testator at his death. The court said that as
to personalty, the construction, i. e., the interpretation of a will for the
purpose of ascertaining the testator's meaning and intention, is generally
governed by the law of the domicile of the testator. Rockwell v.
Bradshaw (1895) 67 Conn. 8; Lincoln v. Perry (1889) 149 Mass. 368.
The same rule is held to apply in the case of realty. 40 Cyc. 1382; Beale,
Cases on the Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, p. 286; Guerard v'. Guerard
(x884) 74 Ga. 5o6; Proctor v. Clark (891) 154 Mass. 45; contra, Yates
v. Thompson (1835) 3 Cl. & F. 544. It is generally said (though perhaps
inaccurately) that the operative effect of a will and the rights of the
parties thereunder as to personalty are determined by the law of the
domicile. 40 Cyc. 1384; Jones v. Habersham (1882) 107 U. S. 174;
Fellows v. Miner (1876) iig Mass. 541. But it is well settled that the law
of the situs governs the disposition or creation of any interest in realty.
Keith v. Keith (1888) 97 Mo. 223; Hobson v. Hale (1884) 95 N. Y. 588.
The latter doctrine applies to the case of dower or statutory right of the
widow in the lands of her husband. Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 174;
Lamar v. Scott (1849) 3 Strob. (S. C.) 562; Newcomer v'. Orem (1852)
2 Md. 297; Staigg v. Atkinson (1887) I44 Mass. 564. It was by virtue
of a provision in the Iowa code that the widow was entitled to her
statutory interest as well as to a life estate. Code of Iowa (1873) secs.
2440, 2452.
J. I. s.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTIoN-DEVISE TO WIDOW-STAACK v. DETTERDING
(917) I6I N. W. (IA.) 44.-The testator devised to his widow all his
realty in fee simple so long as she should remain unmarried. In a suit
to quiet title, the plaintiffs, who are grantees of the devisee, contended that
the widow took a fee simple, and the defendants, as heirs of the deceased,
contended that the words "fee simple" should be given no effect, and
that the widow took only a life estate. Held, that the widow took a
defeasible fee subject to being divested only by her marriage.
RECENT CASES
Of course the determining factor as to what estate passes to a devisee
is the intention of the testator. Bradshaw v. Williams (igio) i4o Ky.
i6o. The intention is to be gathered from the instrument itself. In re
Blake (ipIO) i57 Cal. 448. Effect should, as far as possible, be given to
every word in finding the intention of the testator. In re Sandford
[igoi] i Ch. 93g. A devise during widowhood creates only a life estate.
Shaw v. Sham (I9oi) 115 Ia. 193. But if we give effect to the words
"fee simple" used in the principal case, it seems that we cannot but
conclude that the testator intended that his widow should take a defeasible
fee. That the testator did not devise the remainder over in case his
widow should remarry indicates that he intended her to take more than a
life estate, for otherwise he would die intestate as regards the remainder.
That he made a will in the first place tends to show that he wished to die
testate. In constructing a will to find the intention of the devisor, regard
should not be had to the legal effect of a provision, but if there is any
ambiguity the provision should be construed so as not to lead to an intes-
tacy. Kirby-Smith v. Parnell [1903] Ch. 483. Moreover, in ambiguous
cases, construction should favor the first rather than the second taker.
Fidelity Trust Company v. Bobloski (igio) 228 Pa. St. 52. The court
seems to be correct in holding that the intention of the testator was to
devise a fee instead of a life estate.
F. L. McC.
